Greenpeace

It has come now to the police beating protestors. Tensions are extremely high at the Copenhagen climate talks. Security in the conference center apparently is afraid that their safe bubble will burst if they allow Friends of the Earth to remain inside. How ironic is that? I’m tempted to make this a rant post, but I will try to focus on one theme: negotiating.

Since before Barcelona, over a few weeks ago now, it seems there has been virtually no movement on the most important aspects of a climate agreement. How much will countries commit on paper to reduce their emissions? How much money will wealthy countries commit to help developing countries make sure global emissions reductions are sufficient to avoid catastrophe?

The purpose of ‘negotiating’ is to determine who should do how much – the idea being that negotiating Parties come to the table with at least some flexibility. Hence, one problem in most people’s minds. Some Parties (e.g., US) have come to the table with zero flexibility on how much global warming pollution they will reduce.

Complete inflexibility actually means that Parties are not negotiating at all – they are in Copenhagen just to convince all the other Parties to accept their position. So, the other Parties (e.g., EU), who have already stated some flexibility in their position (20 or 30% emissions reductions by 2020), effectively remain inflexible as well because the conditions for changing their positions rely on the flexibility of other Parties.

But the talks in Copenhagen should not be negotiations anyway. ‘Negotiating’ has a similar connotation as ‘bargaining,’ where everyone tries to get the best deal even if it hurts the other person. We cannot solve global warming with this approach. In actuality, it’s even worse than this! The predominant attitude is that a ‘deal’ can be reached where nobody has to sacrifice anything. This relates to our US climate legislation, which commits to spend zero public dollars on the worst problem of human existence. US policymakers have negotiated away any possibility that the legislation will work.

A saner attitude toward developing climate policy in Copenhagen is for countries to come to the table explaining how they can help solve this crisis. Think of it like your little brother has just fallen into a frozen pond. Who can run the fastest to go find help? Who has a rope? Who is the strongest and can try to pull little brother out? Who has ideas for making sure little brother doesn’t fall in again?

The EU is offering to cut 30% emissions, but only if others will do more? The US will not commit to reduce one whit unless China agrees to complete transparency? Right now countries are using lack of action as leverage to get other countries to do more. But let’s be clear that lack of action means more pollution, and therefore is a decision to cause harm. The approach that ‘I will if you will’ in this case is blackmail, hostage taking, and a game of chicken all at once.

This is not a climate bazaar, where everyone is trying to get the best deal. This is a global problem that everyone needs to come together to solve. Either we all get a good deal, or there is no deal.

A few days ago I gave a presentation here in Copenhagen on why President Obama should not extract his talking points for the international negotiations from the House-passed climate bill.

As we know, their weak stated target of 3% under 1990 by 2020 cannot ensure the planet sees peak emissions by 2015. Scientists tell us this is what we need to avoid reaching a tipping point to runaway climate disruption. However, the President and his delegates here in Copenhagen so far refuse to commit to a serious 2020 target or to say the US will sign something legally binding.

The administration so far has acted as if they are powerless in the face of a vacillating Congress. This despondence has led them to already speak as if it is a foregone conclusion that the serious work will continue in “about 6 months.” There can be no doubt they want to wait for the Senate to finish, but waiting for the Senate is a serious problem for two big reasons.

First, the developing Senate bill may become worse than the House-passed bill with respect to the weak 2020 target. (Both bills already cripple the Clean Air Act’s potential to address global warming pollution.)

Second, the Senate may fail to pass a bill altogether in 2010. The administration cannot and need not wait for new legislation. If the Senate fails to pass a bill, does the world have to experience the same stalling strategy from the US administration next year?

Let’s be completely clear: this decision to wait for Congress is completely political. It’s not because the President is legally bound to wait for Congress. In fact, he could rightly say that Congress already gave him the power to sign an effective climate agreement and to implement it.

Once I finished my presentation here in Copenhagen, Kassie Siegel from the Center for Biological Diversity gave a good explanation of why the President can act now. You can see her paper here.

In 1987 the Congress passed the Global Climate Protection Act (GCPA), which gave the President the power to negotiate and sign an international climate agreement. More importantly, the GCPA gave the president “congressional executive authority,” which many trade bills have utilized to bring the US into subsequent binding international obligations without requiring Senate ratification.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court in 2007 decided that, through its passage of the Clean Air Act, Congress also gave the administration the ability effectively to implement the obligations that would come with an international agreement.

So the question is: Why does the President insist on pretending he doesn’t have the authority to act on the climate?

Yes He Can: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/assets/binaries/yes-he-can-president-obama-s

Biz As Usual: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/assets/binaries/business-as-usual

Presentation: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/assets/binaries/business-as-usual-presentation

Image: Climate change demonstrations in Oslo, during the Peace Prize Ceremony. © Christian Åslund / Greenpeace

I think the administration may be winning, based on some press lately, with their goal to: lower popular expectations significantly and make Copenhagen appear a success even if it violates what the international community agreed to accomplish by Copenhagen.

Recently, President Obama and President Hu of China jointly declared that they "agree on the importance" of carrying through on the Bali Action Plan (BAP). The BAP set all parties on 2-year path to a real agreement with real numbers. Those two years are up in Copenhagen. However, Obama has recently stated his support for delaying an agreement in Copenhagen.

Now we hear from Capitol Hill not just that ‘US Congress may not finish by Copenhagen,’ but that the 'Senate will punt until the Spring' and 'Kerry says climate comes after [not just] health care, [but now] financial reform.' For many reasons, such as that 2010 is going to be a tough election year, this translates to... the US Congress very likely will not pass a climate bill before 2011, by the next scheduled climate meeting in Mexico.

If Obama is waiting for Congress, will his international climate strategy be the same next year? Will he try to lower expectations for Mexico, so it doesn't seem like the US contributed to its failure? Answers to these questions, of course, rely on the president's willingness to invest his time and energy in achieving effective climate policy. But not knowing if that will happen, the question for Copenhagen is how to get a result that prevents a repeat of this US procrastination strategy.

I am starting to wonder if Obama will engage in a serious public campaign on climate before 2011, if even then. We should have seen some hint of this by now. His stated goal for US emissions reductions was actually worse than what the Congress is considering. He has supported a 2020 deadline of getting the US back to 1990 levels of emissions, when the world started to seriously discuss climate change. From the perspective of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, this goal by Obama is to do nothing. We should be reducing about 40% from 1990, not 0%.

In the joint declaration by Obama and Hu, it was sadly apparent which delegation drafted which sentences on carbon sequestration and on nuclear energy. The few public comments from Obama have included endorsement of both of these non-solutions.  We hope President Obama will listen to President Hu and abandon efforts that benefit industry instead of renewable energy solutions that harmonize with goals for a healthy economy and environment.

If we cannot get the BAP fulfilled with any poignance, maybe we can get a pre-launch type of agreement that counts down to a lift-off no later than Mexico. And somehow the US should be given a spanking for not doing its chores (corporal punishment is still normal in many parts of the US). Perhaps that involves a second commitment period for Kyoto, in other words the rest of the world moves forward while the US is an outsider. But the spanking must include thwarting any notion that the US has been a wise and moral leader on climate policy.

Click on some relevant articles below from the last week:

Obama calls for climate pact with 'immediate' effect

Obama must be more engaged on climate change: Greenpeace

U.S. weighs backing interim international climate agreement

Most people here in Barcelona I think would say 'slow progress' is an exaggerated description of the state of climate negotations. For a recent issue of Eco, the daily newsletter of Climate Action Network-International, I wrote this article which goes over a couple elements that may be mucking up negotations as well as confusing domestic discussion of climate legislation.

Many voices are complaining that the US delegation has put no numbers on the table, but there is one number that just keeps popping up. That number is 2005, the base year for the Kerry-Boxer climate legislation.

Even though it was four years ago, 2005 just happens to be the year of the highest US emissions in history. Obviously, reducing 20% of emissions from a higher pool means less reductions. Kerry-Boxer aims to reduce 7% below 1990. Using 2005 base year allows for a more ambitious sounding target.

In Barcelona this proposed base year of 2005 distorts an important discussion on 'comparability' and has become a red herring in assessment of the adequacy of the scale of mitigation targets.

The US delegation often seems to insinuate that 1990 was just an arbitrary base year. Of course, 1990 was not selected at random: it was the year of the IPCC’s First Assessment Report; the year when the world began negotiating what became the Convention.  

But arbitrary or not, shifting to a different base year like 2005 allows the US to imply that the EU proposed mitigation target of 20% by 2020 relative to 1990 is about as ambitious as that in the US legislation. In effect, this amounts to suggesting that emissions reductions elsewhere between 1990 and 2005 are irrelevant to negotiations today.  The comparison we really should be making is the distance between the proposals on the table and what the science is saying we have to do.   

Countries may find it domestically convenient to use a different baseline year, but this presents several problems. Converting reporting data from one country to another appears to be simple enough in theory. But in practice, measurement, reporting and verification requires comparing apples to apples. Converting multiple data points across multiple countries using a variety of different baselines is a convenient recipe for confusion and avoiding the big picture (remember? 'compare the targets to what the science demands').  So even if the experts can provide conversion formulas for differing baselines, there is still a question of public transparency and accountability.

And finally, if the baseline changes, so must the targets. Were we to use a 2005 baseline, the IPCC says global emissions should come down 35-50% by 2020 (as opposed to 25-40% with a 1990 baseline). In the context of history and science, using 1990 is not at all arbitrary.